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The Loma Prieta Earthquake: Implications of Structural Damage
S.A. Mahin
Professor of Civil Engineering, University of California, Berkeley

SYNOPSIS:
The Lama Prieta earthquake provides a wealth of information on the seismic response of a
wide variety of structures over a large metropolitan area. Soil amplification at sites distant from
the epicenter contributed significantly to the substantial damages developed during the earthquake.
Because of the large shaken area, the earthquake provides much useful information for all those
interested in earthquake engineering. Structural damages resulting from the earthquake are reviewed
herein with emphasis on buildings and bridges. Implications for modern design and retrofit methods are
highlighted. Emphasis is placed on the need to carefully consider soil conditions, to treat the
structure as a system rather than as an assemblage of independent elements,
to explicitly define
performance expectations, and to increase efforts to retrofit older seismically hazardous structures.
immediate and long term business revenue, damage
to contents and inventories, medical and workman's compensation claims, and reallocation of
resources is likely several times this amount.

INTRODUCTION
The Lama Prieta earthquake of october 17, 1989
has proven to be one of the most costly natural
disasters in American history. Probably the most
vivid examples of structural damages from the
period immediately following the earthquake were
the catastrophic collapse of the Cypress Street
viaduct on Interstate 880 in Oakland, the partial
collapse of a section of the San Francisco Oakland Bay Bridge and the distress to numerous
buildings in San Francisco's Marina district. As
additional data was gathered during the days and
weeks that followed the earthquake, it became
abundantly clear that damages were far more
extensive than originally suspected.

The human toll of the earthquake was also substantial.
sixty seven fatalities resulted from
the earthquake and more than 3,700 injuries were
reported.
While these numbers are large, they
are no where as large as might have been expected
considering severity of structural damage. This
is attributable in part to the fact that on the
day of the earthquake many people had gone home
early to watch the World Series of baseball. For
example, based on the number of vehicles expected
on the Cypress Viaduct on a normal workday,
estimates of fatalities made just after the
earthquake exceeded 700, substantially greater
than the 42 deaths that actually occurred. This
is indeed fortunate, but it is clear that had the
earthquake occurred under more
normal circumstances, casualties in this and other structures
would likely have been far greater.

In total more than 18,000 dwellings and several
thousand other structures were significantly
damaged by the earthquake. Nearly a thousand of
these were destroyed by the earthquake itself and
500 more have been demolished since the earthquake.
Numerous buildings and bridges stand
empty today as studies continue to determine the
technical and economic feasibility of restoring
their structural integrity.

In addition, the number of damaged and destroyed
dwellings resulted in more than 10,000 displaced
persons.
Finding adequate food and shelter for
these individuals contributed significantly to
the recovery efforts. Fortuitously, the weather
was good and with a few important exceptions the
transportation infrastructure remained intact
permitting relief supplies to be delivered to the
needy.

Particularly severe damages were observed the
epicentral region. The older downtown regions of
santa Cruz, watsonville and Los Gatos (Fig. 1)
were hard hit as were individual homes in the
santa Cruz mountain.
Today, several square
blocks in watsonville and Santa Cruz have been
demolished and stand vacant as silent reminders
of the devastation caused by this earthquake.
Highway and building structures were also damaged
in localized regions throughout the greater San
Francisco Bay Area.
Significant damages were
also observed in lifeline facilities
(water
pipelines and treatment plants in particular) ,
telecommunication facilities, and in the architectural and mechanical components and contents
of buildings.
The total cost of the physical
damages to structures is estimated by FEMA to be
in excess of $ 6.7 billion.
However, the total
cost of the earthquake considering the loss in

The Lama Prieta is the first major earthquake
to strike a major metropolitan area in the U.S.
in nearly 20 years.
As such, it provides the
earthquake engineering profession with a unique
opportunity to assess structural design and
retrofit methods. As the earthquake effected an
area where even larger earthquakes are expected,
an examination of the damages will provide particularly valuable indications of future damage
trends.
Because the levels of motion was not
~musually
severe, and because many different
common structural types and soil conditions wer-e
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Damage was quite serious to a wide variety of
structural types in some areas outside the epicentral region.
In particular, regions of Sar
Francisco, Oakland and other areas as far as 8C
to 100 km. from the epicenter suffered significant damages. Peak ground accelerations recordec
on firm soil at these distances were generally
around 10% of gravity or less. However, most of
the structures damaged in these areas were
concentrated around the San Francisco Bay on man
made ~and overlying bay mud or on soft, deep soil
deposJ.ts.
In these areas motions were recorded
with peak accelerations ranging between 20 and
30% of gravity.

excited, the ea~thquake. should also provide
planners and engJ.neers J.n other parts of the
country with many valuable lessons.
In this paper, the overall nature of the structural damages are reviewed.
After making some
overall comments on the apparent severity and
distribution of the damages, information regarding the specific types of structural damages
observed is presented. Due to space limitations,
emphasis is placed on building structures and
bridges.
Finally, the implications of these
damages for the design of structures in seismically hazardous areas are offered.

Attenuation of peak ground acceleration at
distance was substantially less severe than might
be expected on the basis previous west coast
eart~quakes.
Whether this discrepancy relates to
specJ.al features of the fault mechanism and
resulting directivity for the Lorna Prieta earthquake or unusual, high amplification of the soft
bay mud requ.ires add.i tional study.
Regardless,
the large J.nventorJ.es of older, seismically
vulnerable, structures located over these soils
resulted in substantial numbers of damaged structures.
Soil effects clearly had a dominant
influence on the unusual severity and distribution of damages throughout the Bay Area.

Additional detailed information on the damages
can be found in the References.

SEVERITY AND DISTRIBUTION OF DAMAGES
Ground motions were recorded at 131 sites and in
46 buildings during the earthquake. Correlation
of this information with observed damage will
provide a focus for research for many years to
come.
However, several important observations
regarding the distribution and severity of structural damage can already be made.
First, ground motions recorded in the epicentral
region were quite severe, ranging up to 64% of
gravity.
Motions greater that 30 to 40 percent
of gravity were detected over a very wide area.
Since these levels of motion approach those
considered in the design of new structures, one
might expect to see in these areas some significant damage to engineered structures, especially
to older ones designed to lower force levels.
However, damage in these areas with few exceptions concentrated in older unreinforced masonry
and wooden structures. Other, relatively modern
types of engineered structures with known seismic
vulnerabilities (such as non-ductile reinforced
concrete buildings, tilt-up structures, precast
buildings, etc.) generally survived the motions
in the epicentral region without serious damage.
While the precise reasons for this apparent
anomaly are under study by many at the moment, it
reconfirms the limitations of peak ground acceleration as a reliable index of earthquake damage
potential. In this case, the recorded motions in
the epicentral distance ranged from 6 to 15
seconds, depending on the record and the method
used to determine duration.
This duration is
short for this magnitude event.
In addition,
surface displacements induced by the shaking were
also relatively small in comparison with those
developed during other damaging earthquakes of
this magnitude.
Comparison of the motion and damage data obtained
for this and other earthquakes will provide very
important insight into the factors that influence
damage in structures. Until the outcomes of such
studies are known, it is prudent to acknowledge
that the Lorna Prieta earthquake did not generate
particularly damaging motions in the epicentral
region and that it may not be conservative to
extrapolate damages occurring in this region to
other areas of the Bay Area or the country where
earthquakes with greater damage potential might
occur.
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Nonetheless,
serious damage still concentrat<'d
in only the most vulnerable of structures sine<'
motions still were generally significantly below
current design levels.
On the other hand, the
damage observed possibly provides a reasonable
indication of the damages that might develop over
a wider area if a large local earthquake occurred
in the Bay Area.
In this case, peak accelerations would approach those that developed only on
soft soil during the Lorna Prieta earthquake.
These damages also may provide a useful indication of the nature of damages that might occur
other areas of the country where similar soft
soil conditions exist. The 1989 Lorna Prieta and
1985 Mexico earthquakes clearly point out the
potential vulnerability of urban areas overlying
soft deep soil deposit, even for distant earthquakes. This should have major implications for
the P~cific Northwest, the central u.s. and many
locatJ.ons on the eastern seaboard where similar
conditions exist.
Significant damages also occurred to new and
older buildings in the Palo Alto area.
This
region was relatively close to the epicenter and
had large stocks of buildings.
Ground motions
ranging between 30 and 40 percent of gravity were
recorded. Several new concrete and steel buildings suffered damaged as did older reinforced
concrete, wood and masonry structures.
Thus, it appears that structural damage is highly
dependent on the nature of the building inventori7s present in the shaken area, the types of
soJ.l conditions and the specific characteristics
of the motions generated by the fault rupture and
that arrive at the site. While efforts aimed at
micro-zonation must continue, this sensitivity
makes it from a practical perspective all the
more important to design structures in accordance
with the basic lessons learned from past earthquakes.
These earthquakes have suggested the desirability
of designing simple structures that are inherently insensitive to the uncertainties associated

Another form of damage to wooden structures was
observed in the Marina District in san Francisco.
This area was constructed on loose, fine sandy
During the earthquake the area
hydraulic fill.
exhibited evidence of significant liquefaction
with localized sand boils, lateral spreading,
slumping and heaving of sidewalks and roadways.

Thus,
the input motions and soil conditions.
emphasis should be placed on avoiding systems
with limited redundancy or that tend to concentrate damage in a few locations, on providing
details capable of large inelastic deformations
on selecting structural systems that are able t~
limit ?eformations to reasonable levels, and on
attach1ng nonstructural components in such a
manner that they do not adversely influence
structural response and are not extensively
damaged by the structural deformations.

Many wood buildings were damaged or collapsed in
this area. However, a detailed inspection of the
damages indicates that the collapses concentrate
in three or four story apartment buildings
(Fig. 5) located on the corners of blocks (or
where a structure was not sandwiched between two
oth~r adjacent buildings with little or no sepaThese older apartment buildings were
rat1on).
generally constructed with relatively massive
apartment floors supported over a level of garagThe bottom level thus was largely
es (Fig. 6).
open to allow for multiple garage door openings.
Typically, parking stalls were several cars deep
and often extended out though the back of the
building to provide for even more parking. This
situation resulted in a soft first story. Lateral load resistance was provided by horizontal
wood sheathing (covered by brick veneer) placed
This sheathing was obover only a few walls.
served to have decayed severely in many cases
during the life of the structure.

The damages produced by the Lorna Prieta earthquake must be reviewed to determine the continued
soundness of these past lessons. In the following sections, the performance of a variety of
structures will be reviewed with this in mind.

DAMAGE TO WOODEN BUILDINGS
As indicated previously nearly 20,000 dwelling
units were damaged during the Lorna Prieta earthquake and 10,000 individuals were forced to
A majority of these disrelocate as a result.
placed people lived in wood frame houses and
apartments. Many homes located in the santa cruz
mountains, in the immediate epicentral reg ion,
Damages ranged from fallen chim··
were damaged.
neys and porches to partial or complete collapse.
Many wood frame buildings in the hardest hit.
areas were overwhelmed by the seismically induced
Sadly, the majority of the
inertia forces.
damage occurred in older wood frame buildings
where the structures were simply not connected to
as
During the earthquake
their foundations.
they have in innumerable past earthquakes,' the
structures simply shifted off their foundatior,
with resultant vertical dislocation (Fig. 2).

The amplified seismic motions in the Marina
District resulted in the collapse of the lower
level of these corner apartment buildings in many
It is significant to note that these
cases.
types of apartment complexes are quit common
throughout San Francisco. Some apparently identical buildings located only a few blocks away
from the heavily damaged area, but on firmer
ground, remained virtually undamaged following
Nonetheless, the potential
the earthquake.
hazard posed by these structures during future
more severe earthquakes should be carefully
investigated.

Another common type of failure that was observecl
related wood frame dwellings built upon short.
pony or cripple walls. These short walls provided a two to four foot tall access space that wa!·
used for storage, ventilation and to accommodat•
sloped sites. In many older buildings the framing between the ground floor and the foundatioi
consisted of vertical studs and horizontal sidEven though diagonal braces were providec
ing.
in the upper levels to resist lateral loads, th•
braces were typically omitted from the· pon'
walls. In addition, the horizontal siding cover:
ing these walls in most cases had badly deteriorated and effectively provided little or no
The failure of
lateral resistance (Fig. 3) .
these short support walls resulted in large
vertical and lateral displacements of the supported structures (Fig. 4).

Initial suppositions regarding to the causes of
the severe structural damage in the Marina District focused on the observed soil liquefaction.
However, structures did not collapse or suffer
damage even in the most heavily
subs~antial
affl1cted area, if the lateral load resisting
system was continuous over the height of the
Another remarkable feature was the
building.
limited damage to residential homes located along
the middle of a block. These structures typically were two or three stories tall, with adjacent
structures having the same floor elevations and
As noted in during
virtually no separation.
other recent earthquakes, such structures seem
(at least initially) to buttress one another and
suffer only limited damage.

The unfortunate aspect of both of these forms of
that simple and economical retrofit
damage is
procedures, if implemented prior to the earthcould have prevented or significantly
quake,
reduced the severity of the observed damages.
Repair following the earthquake was generally
extremely expensive as a result of not only the
required structural repairs, but because of wide
spread damages to architectural, electrical and
mechanical features. Pre-earthquake retrofits to
these walls and foundations were seen to be
effective in several instances in Santa Cruz and
elsewhere.

More extensive damage occurred in buildings
Where liquelocated at the corners of blocks.
faction occurred near or under a structure
vertical differential settlements of a few inche;
were observed with resultant structural and
especially architectural damage. Similar damages
~ere also observed in other areas of San Francisco, notably in the Mission Creek area located
south of Market street.

1589

DAMAGE TO UNREINFORCED MASONRY BUILDINGS
The older downtown areas of many well established
cities in California were built of unreinforced
masonry. These commercial areas suffered significant damages in Watsonville, Santa Cruz, Oakland
and San Francisco. However, damage appears to be
strongly influenced by local soil conditions and
the intensity of ground motions.
This can be
seen in the following table where the approximate
numbers of unreinforced masonry (URM) buildings
vacated following the earthquake are compared
with the total stocks in various cities. Cities
are listed in order of decreasing epicentral
distance.

===============
Berkeley
San Francisco
Oakland
South San
Francisco
San Mateo
Salinas
Hollister
Palo Alto
Mountain View
Gilroy
san Jose
Los Gatos
Santa Cruz

================
Approx. Number
of URM Buildings

Number
vacated

400
2000
2000

5
252
400

42
28
96
17
49
20
41
230
29
46

2
1
16
14
0
6
2
3
11
36

================

In some cases in-plane shear failures of bricl
~alls was observed (Fig. 9).
In some cases thi~
distress resulted in local collapse of wal
;1anels. In other buildings wide spread, incliner
':racks developed, stepping along weak morta
·; Jints.
In many cases buildings with moderat•
c~acking have been left un-repaired with continued occupancy or the cracks have been simply
repaired with epoxy injection to insure water
tightness.
Brick and stone architectural veneers fell frorr
many buildings.
Typical metal inserts embeddec
in the mortar joints proved insufficient when thE
attachment nails pulled from the wood framing.
The framing under the veneer
had deterioratec
badly in many of these cases. In other cases th~
veneers were dislodged as a result of hammerins
against adjacent structures.

Table 1. Damage Statistics for URM Buildings
City

reinforcement appeared effective in limiting thi
type of damage.

DAMAGE TO REINFORCED CONCRETE STRUCTURES
tvhile non-ductile concrete frames have performc·'
~-oor1y in past earthquakes, few of these types of
··.lildings (see later comments on concrete bridg;'s)
were located in areas subject to severe
ground shakings during the Loma Prieta earthquake.
In some cases severe shear cracks were
observed in columns.
However, the buildings in
question (for example, along Mission Street near
Third Street in San Francisco) were located midblock with no space separating them from the
adjacent structures.
It is expected that the
adjacent structures provided the required later
resistance in these cases.

=============== ================ ========
Only limited damage was detected in Gilroy, for
instance, even though motions in excess of 50
percent of gravity were recorded in the vicinity
of several unreinforced masonry structures.
I
other cities damage only concentrated in certain
areas, with severe damage in some areas and
virtually none in others. While soil conditions
play an important role in this, the precise
interrelationships between the various factors
influencing damage in this class of hazardous
structure needs careful study.

In Watsonville, where peak accelerations of 39
g were recorded, an old five story reinforc-·.l
concrete frame structure appeared to suff,~r
mainly architectural damage. The building had a
number of broad shear walls which apparently
accounted for its good behavior in spite of the
sever motions recorded in the area.
Damage was observed in a number of newer reinforced concrete structures.
For example, a mechanical penthouse, containing a water tank, fell
from the top of a reinforced concrete multistory
hotel in Burlingame.
Across the street another
hotel, build less than 16 months prior to the
earthquake, suffered significant damages to its
shear walls in the lower levels and to its diaphragms near the shear walls.
Both of these
hotels were constructed on fill over bay mud.
Motions at the nearby San Francisco International
Airport were up to 33%g.

The most prevalent form of damage to these structures was the collapse or dislocation of parapets.
In most of these cases the masonry was
tied to the floor diaphragm by means of steel
anchors.
The short extension of the wall above
the roof fell from many buildings, even where
only moderate ground motions occurred far from
the epicentral region.
A particularly devastating form of damage resulted when the walls were not tied to the floor
diaphragms.
In many cases the walls failed outof-plane, falling into the street (Fig. 7).
In
several notable cases the walls fell from upper
floors of a building onto the roof of a lower
adjacent structure (Fig. 8).
The damage to the
lower building resulted in two deaths in two
separate buildings in Santa Cruz.
In another
instance, five casualties resulted as a wall
collapsed in to the sidewalk area in front of an
unreinforced masonry structure. For the level of
shaking encountered, moderate amounts of tie

A ten story moment frame constructed in San Jose
of lightweight concrete suffered severe spalling
damages in several locations and architectural
damages in spite of ground motions in the area
less than 11 % g.
Lightweight concrete shear
walls in a 15 story telecommunications building
(Fig. 10) in Oakland suffered severe cracking,
spalling and splitting in the lower story. This
building was designed as a dual system with steel
frames proportioned to carry 25% of the lateral
forces along with the gravity loads.
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F.g. 2

Fig. 1

Damage to House Not Bolted to Foundation

Area Map

Fig . 3

Damage to "Pony " Wall

Fig. 4

Collapse of Home on "Pony" Walls

Fig. 6

Typcial Marina District Apartment

f

g. 5

Collapse of Apa rtment in Marina Distri c t

Fig. 7
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Out-of-Plane Failure of Masonry Wall

Damage also occurred in reinforced concrete
buildings used as hospitals and schools.
The
seven story tower of the Peralta Hospital, built
in Oakland in 1927, was severely damaged and has
been demolished following the earthquake.
The
Palo Alto Veterans Administration Hospital suffered serious damage, including shear cracking to
the columns in two of six buildings.
The four
buildings without damage had been previously
retrofit. A number of reinforced concrete buildings on the Stanford University campus, including
the School of Business Administration, the Library and some residence halls suffered moderate
cracking. The John O'Connell High School in San
Francisco suffered serious structural cracking to
its frame-wall system.

protection of the life safety of the occupants b:
adding steel braces and shear walls.
Followin~
the earthquake, the connections in the stee_
braces were observed to buckle (Fig. 12), th"
attachments f the braces to the concrete frame~
had slipped (in some cases due to faulty installation of anchor bolts), extensive crackin~
occurred in the shear walls, and initiation of
punching shear failures in a few column to flat
late connections.
The building has been sincE
repaired (Fig. 13) to restore the capacity that
existed at the time of the earthquake.
Another
example, is the Hotel Oakland in Oakland. This is a steel frame building with extensive masonry infill panels. In retrofitting thi~
structure new lateral load resisting elements.
were added and the exterior masonry elements were
positively attached to the building to prevent
large panels from falling into the street.
As
result of the earthquake nearly all of the masonry piers in the building developed distinctive
x-shaped shear cracks.
In addition, at a few
locations masonry elements were dislodged from
the building and fell to the street (Fig. 14).
This building apparently preserved life safety as
intended, but extensive and expensive repairs
were required to restore the building fully to
service.

DAMAGE TO STEEL BUILDINGS
Damage to steel buildings was typically less
obvious than that to masonry or concrete structures.
However, there were several reports of
buckled braces in several buildings along the San
Francisco Peninsula near San Mateo and Palo Alto.
In most cases these could be fixed within a few
days.
In other cases substantial effort was
needed to find damage in buildings where large
amounts of architectural distress suggested the
presence of structural damage. Evidence of panel
zone buckling, gusset plate yielding and buckling, and column buckling were found in several
buildings.

Most of the focus of retrofit work has logically
been on unreinforced masonry buildings.
In a
recent study by Conrad (1990) 400 of San Francisco's more than 2000 URM buildings were inspected
and 69 were identified that had been retrofit to
some degree. This would indicate that only about
3% of the city's URM buildings have been retrofit. Most of the retrofits had been implemented
through the introduction of steel braces. Retrofit structures tended to be found in clusters
where a local community was being redeveloped.
The report found that 54% of the retrofit buildings suffered no damage, but no comparison with
he performance with adjacent non-retrofit structures was offered. Light damage was observed in
22% of the retrofit structures and moderate
damage was seen in 20%. Heavy damage was seen in
three buildings (3%).

DAMAGE TO RETROFIT STRUCTURES
The engineering profession has known for many
years of the seismic vulnerability of many types
of structural systems and has attempted to retrofit many of these structures.
The Lorna Prieta
earthquake provides an opportunity to assess the
efficacy of the procedures used.
A good example of the effectiveness of retrofits
is the performance of a four story reinforced
concrete telecommunications building in Watsonville.
This building had been be upgraded by
infilling windows and adding shear walls. During
the earthquake accelerations were recorded up to
1.24g at the roof without the building suffering
any significant structural damage. Another example is the retrofit reinforced concrete structures at the Veterans Administration Hospital in
Palo Alto.
As mentioned previously, these
suffered little damage in comparison to the
non-retrofit units.

One of these structures (259 Front Street) was
located at the corner of a block and it was
heavily braced along two street sides (Fig. 15).
The added braces at the street level buckled out
of plane significantly (Fig. 16), but no damage
was actually found in the masonry portions of
this four story building.
The second structure
(1051-1075 Battery Street) was also braced but
the mortar in the existing masonry walls was
apparently so poor that random sections of the
exterior wall fell from the building.
Another
building (located at sixth Street and Bluxome
streets) had apparently been partially retrofit
by addition of wall anchors.
Five people were
killed as the upper level wall on one side of the
structure fell onto the sidewalk and street.
In
all of these cases it is clear that the lack of
a consistent, systems approach to the design of
the retrofits had a detrimental effect and that
a new class of potentially hazardous buildings
(i.e., the inadequately retrofit structure) needs
to be investigated.

on the other hand, there is ample evidence that
some retrofit schemes did not work as well. This
is attributable to the lack of any performance
standards for retrofit work, any code to set load
and detailing requirements, and virtually no
research on the effectiveness of many type of
retrofit procedures used in practice.
One example of this situation is a 6 story reinforced concrete building constructed in San
Francisco at the order of corner and Fourth
Street during the early 1980's (Fig. 11). During
change of ownership a few years after it was
built a number of seismic deficiencies were
identified. These were remedied on the basis of
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Fig . 9

fig . 8

In-Plane Failure of Masonry Wall

Masonry Wal l Fell on to Ad jacent Roof

Fig. 11

Fig. 10

Retrofit of New Reinforced
Building

Concre~ ~

Lightweigh t Concrete Shear Walls
Failed at Base of Building

Fig . 12

Fig. 13

Buckled Brace Intersection
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Repair of Damaged Intersection

DAMAGE DUE TO HAMMERING OF ADJACENT BUILDINGS
Another important observation from the Lorna
Prieta earthquake is that many buildings suffered
damage due to pounding.
The separation of many
buildings was insufficient to avoid collision of
the upper stories.
As a result a wide range of
damage resulted, from local spalling of veneers
near the impact point through cracking of vertical supporting members to failure (though not
collapse) of columns.
Field inspections have
identified several hundred cases where pounding
contributed to the observed damage.
In many
instances it was apparent that a few more cycles
of impact could have caused the failure of one of
the structures involved (Fig. 17).
In many of
the severely damage unreinforced masonry structures evidence suggests that pounding was a
contributor to the damage.
In one instrumented building in Oakland (at the
intersection of 17th and Harrison Streets) the
records show clear evidence of pounding at one
corner of the building.
The steel moment frame
building (with reinforced masonry walls
along
the property lines) was separated from the adjacent unreinforced masonry storefront by about an
inch.
However, no significant damage was observed in either building as a result of the
pounding.
Damage due during the 1985 Mexico and other
earthquakes suggest that pounding is a serious
problem that needs to be addressed by the engineering profession.
A number of investigator s
are currently studying this problem as it relates
to the Lorna Prieta earthquake.

dero viaduct, were under design review for Phas
II retrofits.
The focus of this new retrofi
effort was on tall single columns bents tha
failed catastrophic ally during the 1971 Sa
Fernando event.

DAMAGE TO STEEL BRIDGES
A number of long span steel bridges are used ir
the Bay Area to cross the bay and to span ove
the Sacramento River.
Damage was reported tr
three of these: the San Francisco - Oakland Ba:
Bridge on Interstate 80, the San Mateo - Haywarc
Bridge on
Highway 92 and the Carquinez BridgE
where Interstate 80 crosses the Sacramento River
at Carquinez Straits.
The portion of the San Francisco - Oakland Ba::r
Bridge east of Yerba Buena Island consists of c
double level freeway supported on truss spans.
A large steel tower (numbered E9) is providec.
near the center of this segment of the bridge.
This tower resists longitudinal loads from a
single 506-ft. span to the west and two 290-ft.
spans to the east.
The two concrete roadways
extend across the tower on sets of 50-ft. long,
simply supported steel beams running parallel to
the bridge's longitudinal axis.
Each of these
beams was bolted to a seat angle on the east, but
the seat was allowed to slide freely at the west
end.
During the earthquake the beams slid from
the free end with the west end of the upper deck
resting on the lower one (Figs. 18 and 19). The
lower deck was also unseated and came to
rest
several feet lower on an electrical transformer
housing and the tower braces.
In addition, the bottom chords of the trusses
were attached to the tower by means of twenty
l-in. diameter bolts. During the earthquake the
bolts in the connection on the east side of the
tower sheared completely and the bearing plate
moved approximatel y 5-10 inches to the east.
This was probably the proximate cause of the
roadway beams slipping from their seats.

DAMAGE TO BRIDGE STRUCTURES
More than 1500 bridges exist in the area affected
by the Lorna Prieta earthquake.
Eighty of these
suffered some relatively minor damage during the
earthquake, ten required shoring (though traffic
continued to flow over them during the repairs)
and another ten were closed due to the severity
of the damage.
Three bridges suffered collapse
of one or more spans. These were the double deck
Cypress Street Viaduct, the truss section of the
San Francisco - Oakland Bay Bridge and the Struve
Slough bridge west of Watsonville. The collapsed
span on the Bay Bridge was replaced within about
a month.
The Cypress Street Viaduct has been
demolished, and six other double deck viaducts in
and near San Francisco remain closed a year after
the earthquake awaiting the results of engineering studies to determine whether they can be
economically retrofit. The Struve Slough bridge
was removed and rebuilt within a few months using
modern design practices.

Additional damage to the eastern portions of the
bridge were also identified.
These damages
ranged from spalling of concrete in support piers
to shifting of bearing plates and breakage of
anchor bolts.
The bridge was repaired by jacking the eastern
segments back into place and providing new roadway beams and supports.
The support seats were
constructed about 50% longer than in he original
design.
A more extensive study is currently
under way by Prof. A. Astaneh and his colleagues
at the University of California, Berkeley and by
Caltrans to assess more reliable long term retrofits.

Virtually all of the bridges in the area had
undergone the Phase I retrofit program, initiated
by the California Department of Transportatio n
(Caltrans) following the 1971 san Fernando earthquake.
These retrofits consisted of installing
cable restrainers at bridge expansion joints
which are intended to prevent bridge deck members
from sliding from their seats.
These retrofits
proved to be generally quite effective during the
earthquake.
In addition, at the time of the
earthquake several bridges in the Bay Area,
including the double deck Interstate 480 Embarca-

The San Mateo - Hayward Bridge is a steel orthotopic box girder bridge
with a main span of
750-ft. During the earthquake one of the bearing
assembles on an approach pier shifted.
The cap
screw used to retain the 5-1/2-inch diameter
bearing pin stripped off.
The upper portion of
the bearing assembly shifted with respect to the
lower potion by about 2-3/4 inches.
The bridge
was jacked back into position and repaired without interruption of traffic.
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Fig. 19

Detail of Seat Connection on Bay Bridge

The Carquinez Bridge consists of a pair of steel
cantilever truss spans.
Bearings supporting
steel plate girder on the approach to the bridge
reportedly tipped over.
These were repaired by
jacking the girders up and re-setting the girders. In addition, the piers supporting the truss
spans shifted in some locations as much at 2-inches.

bending forces developed in the decks beinr
transferred to the columns by torsional force.
developed by shear friction.
A relatively massive and brittle structure resulted.
Detailed studies by Nims et al (1989) and other.
have indicated that any of a number of structura_
deficiencies could have triggered the collapse
The lack of redundancy (needed to redistribut<
forces in the event of the failure of an element,
and the brittle details utilized made the fina_
catastrophic outcome a certainty, regardless o.
the actual trigger of the failure and inpu
details.

The closure of the San Francisco - Oakland Bay
Bridge and the damage to the other bridges crossing the bay clearly indicated how vital these
arteries were to transport within the Bay Area.
The Governor of the State of California has since
signed a proclamation mandating that such critical bridge structures be designed to remain
operable following a major earthquake.
This is
a significant departure from the emphasis placed
on life safety in the design of such structures.

The dominant features of the typical collaps•
mechanism are shown in Fig. 22. Shear cracks ir
the pedestal supporting the hinged upper level
columns were able to extend downward into the
joint region following the projection of downwarc
bending hooks on the end of the transverse girder's (cap's) top level reinforcement.
The lac~
shear reinforcement in the joint allowed thh
inclined crack to act like a slide, with the
resultant pancake collapse of the upper level.

DAMAGE TO REINFORCED CONCRETE BRIDGES
The most spectacular damage to reinforced concrete bridges was the catastrophic collapse of
nearly a mile long portion of the upper deck of
the
Cypress Street Viaduct located in west
Oakland on poor soil reclaimed from the bay (Fig.
20).
This structure was designed in the early
1950's and construction was completed in 1957.
The death toll for his collapse was 42, though as
mentioned earlier a thousand fatalities or so
casualties might have been expected had the
earthquake occurred during congested rush hour
traffic. A variety of factors contributed to the
failure of the structure.
These include the
amplification of the ground motions in the vicinity due to the soft soil conditions, traveling
wave effects, and variable soil conditions. The
structure also was designed at a time when earthquake resistant design procedures were not highly
developed.
Thus, while the bridge appears to
have been conservatively designed relative to the
structural requirements in force at the time of
its construction, it has a number of major deficiencies with respect to current construction
practices.

The sudden and catastrophic nature of this failure mechanism was demonstrated convincingly
during the demolition of the Viaduct. A wreckin~
ball was used to initiate failure in a singlE
column. Almost immediately progressive collapsE
occurred throughout the upper level not only
extending transversely across the roadway, bur
also longitudinally for six bays to the end c f
the remaining standing portion of the viaduct.
Clearly, such brittle structures are not compatible with seismic resistant design.
Upon construction of the Cypress Street Viaduc~
a series of six other double deck viaducts were
designed and constructed in the Bay Area. All of
these suffered damages during the earthquake.
Each suffered characteristic distress in the
lower joint regions similar to that developed ir
the cypress Street structure. An example of thi~
is the Southern Freeway portion of Interstate 28(
located near the southern border of San Franciscc
(Fig. 24).

This bridge represented in many respects a substantial advance in the state of the art at the
time it was built.
Not only did it have two
levels, it was one of the first major bridge
structures in the U.S. to employ post-tensioning
and large diameter reinforcing bars.
In mqst
cases the structural system incorporated a significant number of flexural hinges in order
simplify the future addition of access ramps, to
reduce secondary forces resulting from deformations associated with post- tensioning and foundation settlement, to reduce computational effort
and to control moments that could be transferred
to the foundations. This resulted in a structure
that was nearly statically determinant. In addition, detailing did not incorporate features
needed to impart ductility to the elements (shear
reinforcement sufficient to develop the flexural
capacity of members, confinement of potential
plastic hinge regions and inadequate development
length on reinforcement),
and joints were neither confined nor designed to resist the shear
forces associated with realistic lateral loadings.
Details of a typical transverse bent are
shown in Fig. 21. In addition, in the longitudinal direction, frame action depended on the
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A bent in a curved connector structure betweer
Interstates 880 and 980 near the Cypress Viaduct
also suffered damage.
A knee joint extending
transversely from the side of the deck developed
severe shear cracks and a #18 bar fractured at
the hook (Fig. 25).
The apparently inadequa~
shear capacity of such joints is of concern sine~
the structure was only about two years old at the
time of the earthquake.
Similar damages were
seen on several older single level viaducts
(e.g., where Interstate 280 crosses Mission
Creek).
Improved design criteria and retrofit
procedures for such knee joints are under investigation by Caltrans.
Two
short bridges crossed over Struve Slough
near Watsonville.
These consisted of multiple,
skewed T-beam spans supported on monolithic pile
bents.
During the earthquake the supporting
piles failed in shear, resulting in the deck on
one of the bridges collapsing and the piles
punching up through the deck.

Another bent had inclined rock anchors grouted in
the lower joints.
This bonded reinforcement
pr~ved
effective in resisting perpendicularly
or1ented shear cracks. However, towards the end
~f.the tests spal~ing and flexural cracking and
J01nt shear crack1ng had begun.
The continued
integrity of this retrofit scheme under these
conditions was not fully addressed.

RETROFIT TESTS OF CYPRESS VIADUCT
The need for rapid retrofit of the damaged double
deck freeways in San Francisco led to a series of
field te~ts on undamaged portions of the Cypress
Street V1aduct. These tests consisted of forced
vibra~io~ studies to determine the dynamic character1st1cs of the structure and static lateral
load tests in the transverse direction to determine force and deformation capacities.
Tests
were performed on a relatively unmodified segment
of the.structure, a~ well as on the same segment
after 1t was retrof1t.
The three bents used in
the tests are shown in Fig. 26.
The results of
the~e
tests have been reported by Moehle and
Mah1n (1990).

The third retrofit consisted of a heavy steel
collar placed around the pedestal and the base of
the ~pper level colu~n.
This collar was postten~1oned
to the s1des of the lower joint.
Dur1ng the test the collar was observed to rotate
about the 1 ower joint and , upon its remov a 1
~oll~wing
the tests, fully developed sets of
1ncl1ned cracks were observed in the joint along
with much pulverized concrete.

Tests on the original structure indicate that the
';IPJ?er column pedestal and the adjacent lower
J01nt developed cracking characteristic of the
damage leading to the failure of the structure
(Fig. 22) at a displacement of about 3/4-in. at
the upper deck level. The total lateral load of
1400 kips.applied to the three bents corresponds
to an equ1valent base shear coefficient of about
0.32 assuming a 2:1 distribution of loads to the
upper and lower deck levels.
A simple elastic
time history analysis of the test structure has
shown that it would have required a base shear
coefficient of at least 61% to have remained
elas~ic for a ground motion recorded nearby.
The
work1ng stress base shear coefficient required in
the original design was 0.06.

These tests indicate the effectiveness of retrofitting existing bridge structures.
However,
they point out the need to consider a structure
as a system and not to simply fix the damaged or
overstressed portions.
The limitations of the
tests must also be recognized.
Loading of the
test structure was halted when the test site had
to be vacated. However, it was not believed safe
to continue testing at that time.
The deformation history imposed may not be conservative for
the most severe ground motions expected in the
Bay Area.
In addition, no attempt was rnade to
retrofit or test the structure in the longitudinal direction and this mode of behavior must be
carefully considered.

Three different types of retrofits for the lower
joints were investigated. In addition upper and
lowe: bent caps (girders) were exter~ally posttens1oned to help compensate for inadequate bar
development lengths, and to provide increased
strength and confinement in the joints. Most of
the columns were reinforced in shear by adding
exterior post-tensioning.

LOSS OF FUNCTIONALITY
An important observation regarding the damage to
structures has been the public 1 s reaction to
them.
Most structures performed generally in
c~nformance with the design professions expectat1ons. New structures and most engineered structures did not collapse, and life safety was
protected, in regions of severe shaking. However, these motions were not the most severe or
damaging that might be expected in the Bay Area.
Moreover, the public reaction to these damages
was generally that they were excessive.

The retrofits were able to maintain the vertical
load integrity of the test structure.
However,
significant damage was observed. In particular
the critical failure zone moved away from th~
lo~er join~ ~o the upper joints, which began to
fa11 and d1s1ntegrate during the tests.
Shear
cracks in the upper joints began at displacements
at the upper deck level less than l-in. In addition,the non-retrofit columns began to fail in
shear at an upper deck level displacement of
about 1.5-in. and an equivalent base shear coefficient of about 0.61.

There was much nonstructural damage to partitions, ceilings, cladding and contents (Fig. 28)
in structures with little or no structural damage. T?is damage not only contributed a significant l1fe safety threat in many cases, it disrupted the functionality of the structures and
added substantially to repair costs.
One ten
story building in Oakland reportedly had $6
million in water damages due to the breakage of
a fire sprinkler line.

After strengthening the shear damaged columns,
the structure was again cycled and lateral displacements of 9.8-in. were achieved at its top
along with equivalent base shear coefficients of
o. 91.
These values are about 13 and 3 times
greater, respectively, than the values that could
have been developed by the original structure.

Structural damages were repaired quickly in many
cases, but in other cases considerable delays
were encountered as owners await financing or as
technical difficulties are encountered. In many
cases the resulting repairs were cosmetic or
intended to simply restore the structure to its
pre-quake condition.

One of the bents had heavy steel wide flange
sections post-tensioned vertically along the face
of the columns like splints.
During the tests
composite action could not be maintained and the
relatively long lengths of unbounded post-tensioning steel used resulted in large cracks and
spalling in the lower joints and in gaps between
the steel and the concrete (loss of confinement)
over large portion of the columns and joints.

Large institutional owners or ones with significant capital investments have increasingly developed heightened awareness of the need to control
damage.
In addition to consideration of life
safety for a structure 1 s occupants, they have
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Damaged Knee Joint in New Freeway

become concerned over institutional life safety.
For example, Stanford University has developed
much more stringent criteria since the earthquake
for retrofitting their seismically hazardous
buildings.
Having had to relocate several .d7partments and instructional and research ~ac1l1ties following the earthquake, they now st1pulate
that buildings should be designed or retrofit to
permit repairs to be made withi.n a few days or
weeks of the earthquake (depend1ng on the occupancy of the building). Other institutions that
cannot similarly just pick up and move have come
to similar conclusions.
Similarly, the .Gove:nor•s proclamation also indica~es that Cal1f?rn1a
state buildings should be bu1lt or r~trof1t.so
that they would remain operable follow1ng a ma~or
earthquake.
This is a major departure relat1ve
to the design of buildings.

IMPLICATIONS FOR EARTHQUAKE RESISTANT DESIGN
Few new lessons have been developed as a result
of the Loma Prieta earthquake. However, as the
first major urban earthquake in the U.S. in
nearly two decades, the earthquake stands as a
compelling reminder of many important p~s~ lessons.
we have again seen the vulnerab~l1ty ~f
several major classes of buildings des1gned 1n
earlier eras when our knowledge of earthquake
resistance was not fully developed. The.da~ages
to the numerous unreinforced concrete bu1ld1ngs,
wood dwellings with inadequate foundation.atta~h
ments, soft story structures (e.g., .Mar1na D1strict apartment houses) and non-duct1le co:r;crete
fr·ames (e.g., double deck viaducts) are rem1nders
of well-known past lessons.
similarly, the important effects of soil liqu7faction and site amplification have been see:r; 1n
many past earthquakes, such as the 1985 Mex1co,
1967 Venezuela and 1964 Nigatta, Japan earthquakes. The Lorna Prieta earthquake indicates t~at
these soft soil sites should be carefully cons1dered in design as they will be sensitive not only
to close earthquakes, but also to any number of
earthquakes gEnerated on other relatively distant
faults.
The special need to have a safe ~nd dependable
transportation system has been aga1n demonstrated. It has been seen that certain structures may
be more critical than others, and greater levels
of conservatism should be considered in their
design.
At the same time some past phenomena were not
seen. However, the Lama Prieta earthquake appears
to be an unusual earthquake in many respects and
its motion in the epicentral region appears not
to be as damaging as other typical west co~st
earthquakes have been.
Thus, th~ good.behav1or
of some types of structures dur1ng th1~ eart~
quake should not lead to complacency 1n the1r
retrofit given the seismicity of the Bay Area.
The damages provide a clear warning to the Bay
Area and to other seismically active areas to
increase preparedness activities. In partic~la7,
the substantial hazard posed by our older se1~m1cally vulnerable structures mu~t be remed17d •
This can only be done through rel1able e~aluat1on
and retrofit criteria developed and val1d~ted.on
the basis of laboratory research and quant1tat1ve
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investigations of the seismic
buildings during earthquakes.

performance

of

The earthquake has shown a greater value being
placed by the public, government and corporate
entities on reducing economic as well as life
hazards.
Control of damage during earthquakes
need not involve great expense, but additional
attention to the selection of the structural
system and to detailing of nonstructural com~o
nents. Additional research is needed to prov1de
a reliable design basis for such considerations.
Finally, it must be recalled that the timing and
location of the Lorna Prieta earthquake were
fortuitous. The epicenter was in a sparsely
populated region relatively far from urban centers. It also occurred at a time when many people
were away from the most vulnerable structures.
This set of favorable circumstances can not be
expected to occur for all future earthquakes.
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